



HACK IN BO®
Winter 2017 Edition
Bologna - Sabato 14 Ottobre

**ADVANCED MOBILE
PENETRATION TESTING
WITH BRIDA**

THE SPEAKER



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Security Advisor


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- OSCP, CREST PEN, CSSLP
- 7+ years in Penetration Testing
- Focused on application security
- Developer of sec tools:
<https://github.com/federicodotta>
- Trainer



TOPICS



WEB APPLICATION

- Fixed client (web browser)
- Logic usually is mainly on the backend components
- Client-side application code usually is coded with interpreted languages
- Provisioned directly from the application server

MOBILE APPLICATION

- Custom compiled client
- Logic usually divided between client and backend
- Client-side application code can be interpreted or compiled
- Provisioned from a trusted third party


MOBILE APPLICATIONS

It's **almost impossible** to test a complex mobile application adequately without skills in:

- Reversing (Java for Android but also ARM64 for iOS applications)
- Instrumentation and debugging
- Development of custom plugins for your favorite HTTP Proxy (Burp Suite, OWASP ZAP)

LET'S PLAY!






LEVEL 1


- NO SECURITY FEATURES





LEVEL 1

- NO SECURITY FEATURES




1. Set an HTTP proxy in the device.
2. Intercept data traffic
3. Test the backend!

PORTSWIGGER BURP SUITE




- Suite of tools that helps penetration testers during the assessment
- Contains a lot of useful tools: HTTP Proxy, Intruder (fuzzer), a great automatic Scanner and a Repeater Tool
- Furthermore, it offers an external server very useful to test external service interactions (Collaborator) and a very good session manager
- It exports API to extend its functionalities, and consequently a huge number of plugins have been released by various developers that aid pentesters in almost every situation.
- It is de-facto standard for web application security testing.



LEVEL 2


- SSL (AND THE CLIENT CHECKS FOR VALID SERVER CERTIFICATES)







LEVEL 2

- **SSL (AND THE CLIENT CHECKS FOR VALID SERVER CERTIFICATES)**

- 
1. Install Burp Suite CA certificate in the device
 2. Set Burp Suite as proxy in the device
 3. Intercept data traffic
 4. Test the backend!






LEVEL 3

- **SSL**
- **CERTIFICATE PINNING (THE CLIENT CHECKS FOR SPECIFIC SERVER CERTIFICATES)**





LEVEL 3

- **SSL**
- **CERTIFICATE PINNING (THE CLIENT CHECKS FOR SPECIFIC SERVER CERTIFICATES)**

Now complications start! We can try generic tools/scripts for pinning bypass, but often we need to reverse the application and bypass the check.
For this task our favorite tool is Frida!

SSL PINNING BYPASS - 1

- If you are lucky, several generic tools and scripts try to bypass SSL pinning implemented in common ways.
- Android Example: Universal Android SSL Pinning Bypass with Frida
(<https://codeshare.frida.re/@pcipolloni/universal-android-ssl-pinning-bypass-with-frida/>)
- iOS Examples: Burp Suite Mobile Assistant
(https://portswigger.net/burp/help/mobile_testing_using_mobile_assistant.html) and SSL Kill Switch 2
(<https://github.com/nabla-c0d3/ssl-kill-switch2>)

SSL PINNING BYPASS - 2

- But if you are not so lucky... it's time to reverse the application!
 - For Android applications: decompile dex and get Java code
 - For iOS applications and Android native libraries: disassemble code with IDA Pro (<https://www.hex-rays.com/products/ida/>), Radare2 (<https://github.com/radare/radare2>) or Hopper (<https://www.hopperapp.com/>)
- Once you locate the SSL Pinning code, you can patch the binary or you can dynamically modify code at runtime

FRIDA

- *Frida is a dynamic code instrumentation toolkit. It lets you inject snippets of JavaScript or your own library into native apps on Windows, macOS, GNU/Linux, iOS, Android, and QNX. (cit. www.frida.re)*
- It is an amazing tool and it works both on iOS and on Android, allowing to inspect and modify running mobile code
- The **hooks** are specified with JavaScript language and can be used for **instrumentation** and **replacement** of Java and Objective-C functions

SSL PINNING BYPASS – FRIDA

EXAMPLE

```
1  // SampleClass - (bool)checkServerCertificate:(id)
2  var hookSampleClass = ObjC.classes.SampleClass["- checkServerCertificate:"];
3
4  Interceptor.attach(hookSampleClass.implementation, {
5
6      onEnter: function(args) {
7      },
8
9      onLeave: function(retval) {
10         send("Bypassing Pinning");
11         retval.replace(ptr(1));
12     }
13
14 });
```



LEVEL 4

- SSL
- CERTIFICATE PINNING
- POST BODIES ENCRYPTED WITH SYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION





LEVEL 4

- **SSL**
- **CERTIFICATE PINNING**
- **POST BODIES ENCRYPTED WITH SYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION**

1. Install Burp Suite certificate in the device
2. Set Burp Suite as proxy in the device
3. Bypass SSL Pinning
4. Ouch! All POST bodies are encrypted! :’(

A BIG BASE64 BODY OF RAW BINARY DATA...

```
POST /login HTTP/1.1
```

```
Host: www.test.com
```

```
...
```

```
parameters=djshfjdsvcxuchvjfdbfvbjfdbakfdshfcjxnnvdfjsf  
jdanjfndsjncjxknjskdnfjnfvxcnjkansdjksncxjndjskjcndjshfj  
dsvcxuchvjfdbfvbjfdbakfdshfcjxnnvdfjsfjdanjfndsjncjxknj  
skdnfjnfvxcnjkansdjksncxjndjskjcndjshfjdsvcxuchvjfdbfvjb  
jfdbakfdshfcjxnnvdfjsfjdanjfndsjncjxknjskdnfjnfvxcnjkans  
djksncxjndjskjcndjshfjdsvcxuchvjfdbfvbjfdbakfdshfcjxnnv  
dfjsfjdanjfndsjncjxknjskdnfjnfvxcnjkansdjksncxjndjskjcncn%  
3d%3d
```


LET'S REVERSE

```
SampleClass + (id)generatePostBody :(id)  
SampleClass + (id)getClearTextMessage :(id)
```

LET'S REVERSE

FRIDA

```
SampleClass + (id)generatePostBody :(id)  
SampleClass + (id)getClearTextMessage :(id)
```



```
// SampleClass + (id) generatePostBody :(id)  
var hookGeneratePostBody =  
  ObjC.classes.SampleClass["+ generatePostBody:"];  
Interceptor.attach(generatePostBody.implementation, {  
  
  onEnter: function(args) {  
    var obj_input = ObjC.Object(args[2]);  
    send("* generatePostBody input:");  
    send(obj_input.toString());  
  },  
  
  onLeave: function(retval) {  
    var obj_output = ObjC.Object(retval);  
    send("* generatePostBody output:");  
    send(obj_output.toString());  
  }  
  
});
```

LET'S REVERSE

FRIDA

```
SampleClass + (id)generatePostBody :(id)
SampleClass + (id)getClearTextMessage :(id)
```

```
...
* generatePostBody input:
{"username":"test","password":"testPassword"}
* generatePostBody output:
djshfjdsvcxuchvjsdbfvbjbjfndakfdshfcjxnnvdfjsfj
danjfndsjncjxknjskdnfjnfvxcnjkansdjksncxjndjsk
jcndjshfjdsvcxuchvjsdbfvbjbjfndakfdshfcjxnnvdfj
sfjdjanjfndsjncjxknjskdnfjnfvxcnjkansdjksncxjnd
jskjcnjdjshfjdsvcxuchvjsdbfvbjbjfndakfdshfcjxnn
dfjsfjdjanjfndsjncjxknjskdnfjnfvxcnjkansdjksncx
jndjskjcnjdjshfjdsvcxuchvjsdbfvbjbjfndakfdshfcjx
nnvdfjsfjdjanjfndsjncjxknjskdnfjnfvxcnjkansdjks
ncxjndjskjcn==
...
```

```
// SampleClass + (id) generatePostBody :(id)
var hookGeneratePostBody =
  ObjC.classes.SampleClass["+ generatePostBody:"];
Interceptor.attach(generatePostBody.implementation, {

  onEnter: function(args) {
    var obj_input = ObjC.Object(args[2]);
    send("* generatePostBody input:");
    send(obj_input.toString());
  },

  onLeave: function(retval) {
    var obj_output = ObjC.Object(retval);
    send("* generatePostBody output:");
    send(obj_output.toString());
  }

});
```



MORE REVERSING...

```
POST /login HTTP/1.1
```

Host: www.test.com

...

```
parameters=djshfjdsvcxuchvjfdbfvbjbfndakfdshfcjxnnvdfjsfjdanjfnds  
jcjxknjskdnfjnjevxcnjkansdjksncxjndjskjcn  
djshfjdsvcxuchvjfdbfvbjbfndakfdshfcjxnnvdfjsfjdanjfnds  
jcjxknjskdnfjnjevxcnjkansdjksncxjndjskjcn  
djshfjdsvcxuchvjfdbfvbjbfndakfdshfcjxnnvdfjsfjdanjfnds  
jcjxknjskdnfjnjevxcnjkansdjksncxjndjskjcn%3d%3d
```

Reverse  `base64EncodedText = Base64(AES(clear-text))`

MORE REVERSING...

```
POST /login HTTP/1.1
```

```
Host: www.test.com
```

```
...
```


```
parameters=djshfjdsvcxuchvjfdbfvbjfndakfdshfcjxnnvdfjsfjdanjfnds  
cjxknjskdnfjnfvxcnjkansdjksncxjndjskjcndjsfjdsvcxuchvjfdbfvbjfnda  
kfdshfcjxnnvdfjsfjdanjfnds jncjxknjskdnfjnfvxcnjkansdjksncxjndjskjc  
djshfjdsvcxuchvjfdbfvbjfndakfdshfcjxnnvdfjsfjdanjfnds jncjxknjskdnf  
jnfvxcnjkansdjksncxjndjskjcndjsfjdsvcxuchvjfdbfvbjfndakfdshfcjxnn  
vdfjsfjdanjfnds jncjxknjskdnfjnfvxcnjkansdjksncxjndjskjcnc%3d%3d
```

Reverse  Base64EncodedText = Base64(AES(clear-text))

KEY?

FRIDA TO THE RESCUE!

```
Interceptor.attach(
  Module.findExportByName("libSystem.B.dylib", "CCCrypt"), {
    onEnter: function(args) {
      send("CCOperation: " + parseInt(args[0]));
      send("CCAlgorithm: " + parseInt(args[1]));
      send("CCOptions: " + parseInt(args[2]));
      send("Key:");
      send(hexdump(ptr(args[3]), {
        offset: 0,
        length: parseInt(args[4]),
        header: true,
        ansi: true
      }));
      send("Key length: " + parseInt(args[4]));
      ...
    });
  });
```



```
...
CCOperation: 0 (encrypt)
CCAlgorithm: 0 (kCCAlgorithmAES128)
CCOptions: 1 (kCCOptionPKCS7Padding)
Key: testPassword (in ASCII to make it more
readable)
Key length: 16
...
```



And where is the key stored?
Often it's hard-coded in the binary!



AND NOW THE CODING PART

- Great! Now we have only to code a Burp Suite plugin to decrypt requests and responses and to re-encrypt them if modified
- It seems simple, but it is not always so... We have to find a library that offers the same algorithm with the same parameters (padding, key size, etc.). Java **Bouncy Castle** is the way!
- Many hours of coding work!

HOW THE PLUGIN SHOULD BE CODED?

- We want to write a Burp Suite plugin **user-friendly** enough to test this particular application.
- We want to add a custom **editable** subtab containing the decrypted request/response
- We want be able to **modify** the decrypted requests
- It's not an option: it's the only way to test the backend!

AND HERE IS THE RESULT...

Request

Raw

Params

Headers

Hex

Decrypted data

POST /login HTTP/1.1
Host: test.com
Content-Length: 234

parameters=asdhbdfhjvbkdsjkdnsfjnsjkfdhj sbfhjdsxcnckdnsjksncjndskj cndnskdnsdjncdskj
cnkdj scnkdsjcnkjdsenjkdnsckjdnsckjdnscksdncksdnkjxhvsoroiewjdsfkfnxncvkjndsjkdnaks
jdnjsknfdjnvjhenxhjcbdhjbvfnsdkjasfneuhfdsuknjkdncjkdnjknkj%3d%3d

Request

Raw


Params

Headers

Hex

Decrypted data

{"username": "test", "password": "testPassword"}




LEVEL 5


- SSL
- CERTIFICATE PINNING
- POST BODIES ENCRYPTED WITH SYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION AS THE PREVIOUS LEVEL, BUT...

... NOW EVERY REQUEST IS ENCRYPTED WITH A DIFFERENT RANDOMLY GENERATED KEY. THIS KEY IS THEN ENCRYPTED WITH ASYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION AND SENT WITH THE MESSAGE IN THE BODY!


ENCRYPTION SCHEME - CLIENT SIDE




DECRYPTION SCHEME – SERVER SIDE



We don't have
the private key
necessary to
decrypt the
random key




We can't
decrypt the
random key




We can't decrypt
the body from
our custom-
written Burp Suite
plugin. Stop.

We don't have
the private key
necessary to
decrypt the
random key



We can't
decrypt the

**We have to
find another
way.**



We can't decrypt
the body from
our custom-
written Burp Suite
plugin. S



HOW CAN WE CODE THE PLUGIN NOW?

OPTION 1

We can trap CCEncrypt function with Frida (as seen before) and print the asymmetric keys before they are encrypted.

Not convenient. We need to pass to the plugin a new key for every request (if we try 20 SQL injection vectors we have to manually insert 20 keys in the plugin)

HOW CAN WE CODE THE PLUGIN NOW?

OPTION 2

We can replace the public key used for the encryption of the key (physically if it is stored on the device or with Frida) with a public key generated by us (as a classic **MitM with SSL**).

This way, Burp can decrypt the random key, and re-encrypt it with the public key of the server.

More convenient, but it requires more coding work, because the Burp Suite plugin has to deal also with public key encryption and not only with symmetric encryption.

THINK OUTSIDE THE BOX

- Ok, and if we trap the function that generates the random values with Frida and replace the return value with a fixed string? For example 0x1111111111111111 ?
- In this way we can write a plugin that encrypts/decrypts the JSON of every request with the chosen fixed key without considering the part of the asymmetric encryption at all!
- And the **problem is solved!**



THE PROBLEM HAS BEEN SOLVED **BUT...**

- We spent a lot of time in reversing!
- We spent a lot of time in coding!
- What if the application employs a custom encryption method? We need to reverse and re-implement in Java, Python or Ruby the custom encryption method.
Very time consuming!
- What if we can't find a library that offers the same encryption/signature algorithm with the same parameters of the mobile application?

**WE NEED A MORE
CONVENIENT WAY!**





LEVEL 6 FINAL BOSS!

- SSL
- CERTIFICATE PINNING
- POST BODIES ENCRYPTED WITH SYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION
- KEYS ENCRYPTED WITH ASYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION AS THE PREVIOUS LEVEL, BUT...

... NOW THE BACKEND CHECKS THE INSERTED KEY AND DISCARDS IT IF IT HAS BEEN USED IN THE PREVIOUS REQUESTS!



THE FINAL BOSS!

- We can't use Frida to replace the generated key with a fixed string, because it will work only for the first request!
- We can return to the inconvenient way (print the key with Frida and manually insert every key in Burp Suite) or to the heavy-code way (change the public key with a generated one and a complex Burp Suite plugin that handles both symmetric and asymmetric encryption)
- Or... we have to find a way to let Burp talk with Frida!

AUTHORS

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CONTRIBUTORS

- MAURIZIO AGAZZINI



WITHOUT BRIDA

```
POST /login HTTP/1.1
```

Host: www.test.com

...

```
parameters=djshfjdsvcxuchvjfdbfvbjfndakfdshfcjxnnvdfjsfjdanjfnds  
jcjxknjskdnfjnjevxcnjkansdjksncxjndjskjcn  
djshfjdsvcxuchvjfdbfvbjfndakfdshfcjxnnvdfjsfjdanjfnds  
jcjxknjskdnfjnjevxcnjkansdjksncxjndjskjcn  
djshfjdsvcxuchvjfdbfvbjfndakfdshfcjxnnvdfjsfjdanjfnds  
jcjxknjskdnfjnjevxcnjkansdjksncxjndjskjcn%3d%3d
```

Reverse Base64EncodedText = Base64(AES(clear-text,random_key) + RSA(random_key,public_key))



WITHOUT BRIDA

```
POST /login HTTP/1.1
Host: www.test.com
...
parameters=djshfj...svbjbfndak...jxnnvdfjsfjdanjfndsjn
cjxknjskdnfjnfvx...sdj...ljskjcn...svcxuchvjsdbfvbjbfnda
kfdshfcjxnnvdfjs...fnds...kdnfjn...kansdjksncxjndjskjc
djshfjdsvcxuchvjs...bjbfndak...nnvd...danjfndsncjxknjskdnf
jnfvxcnjkansdjks...ljskjcn...sv...ofvbjbfndakfdshfcjxnn
vdfjsfjdanjfnds...skdnfjnfvx...xjndjskjc%3d%3d
```

Reverse  AES(clear-text,random_key) +
KEY? RSA(random_key,public_key))

WITH BRIDA

```
POST /login HTTP/1.1
Host: www.test.com
...
parameters=djshfjdsvca
cjxknjskdnfjnfvxcnjkansd
kfdshfcjxnnvdfjsfjdanjf
djshfjdsvcxuchvjsdbfv
jnfvxcnjkansdjksncxjndjskjcndjs
vdfjsfjdanjfndsjncjxknjskdnfjn
```

We don't have to deeply reverse and implement complex plugins! We can simply ask the target application to encrypt/decrypt messages for us!



```
SampleClass + (id) generatePostBody :(id)
SampleClass + (id) getClearTextMessage :(id)
```

fcjxnn
d

WITH BRIDA

- When we have to decrypt a message, we use Brida to ask the application to decrypt the message for us
- When we have to encrypt a message, we use Brida to ask the application to encrypt the message for us
- We don't need to know how the message is encrypted/decrypted!!

WITH BRIDA

- Much less reversing! (days!)
- Much less coding! (We don't need to reimplement encryption/decryption/signature functions, we simply use directly the iOS application functions)
- We can write a simple Burp Suite plugin with few lines of code to do the job!

LEVEL 1

LEVEL 2

- SSL

LEVEL 3

- SSL
- Certificate pinning

LEVEL 4

- SSL
- Certificate pinning
- POST bodies encrypted with symmetric encryption



LEVEL 5

- SSL
- Certificate pinning
- POST bodies encrypted with symmetric encryption
- Keys encrypted with asymmetric encryption




LEVEL 6

- SSL
- Certificate pinning
- POST bodies encrypted with symmetric encryption
- Keys encrypted with asymmetric encryption as the previous level
- Check previous keys



HOW DOES IT WORK?



HOW DOES IT WORK?

- Thanks to the «rpc» object of Frida it is possible to expose RPC-style functions
- From Burp Suite we call a Pyro function that acts as a bridge
- Pyro calls the selected Frida exported function and returns the result back to Burp Suite

USING BRIDA – DEDICATED TAB

Stub generator		Execute method	
Method name: encryptbody			
Argument: {"username":"test","password":"testPassword"}		Add	
Argument list:		Remove	
		Modify	


Kill application
Reload JS
Java Stub
Python Stub
Save settings to file
Load settings from file
Execute Method



```
rpc.exports = {  
  
  encryptbody: function(body) {  
    var res = ObjC.classes.SampleClass.generatePostBody(body);  
    return res.toString();  
  }  
  
}
```




USING BRIDA - CONTEXT MENU





```
contextcustom2: function(message) {  
    var res = ObjC.classes.SampleClass.generatePostBody(message);  
    return res.toString();  
},
```

```
contextcustom1: function(message) {  
    var res = ObjC.classes.SampleClass.getClearTextMessage(message);  
    return res.toString();  
},
```



USING BRIDA - CUSTOM PLUGIN



A PRACTICAL EXAMPLE: SIGNAL



- Signal is an **encrypted communications application** for Android and iOS.
- Signal is perfect as an example because it **encrypts messages** and because it is **open source**
- We redirect iOS traffic through Burp Suite (bypassing pinning)
- We use Brida and a custom plugin to dynamically modify the content of every message in «pwned»

HANDS ON WITH SIGNAL!

Burp Intruder Repeater Window Help

Target	Proxy	Spider	Scanner	Intruder	Repeater	Sequencer	Decoder	Comparer	Extender	Project options	User options	Alerts	Logger++	Brida
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Server status: **running**

Application status: **spawned**

Python binary path: C:\Python27\python.exe

Pyro host: localhost

Pyro port: 9999

Frida JS file path: scriptSignal.js

Application ID: org.whispersystems.signal

☒ Frida Remote ☐ Frida Local

SCRIPTSIGNAL.JS


```
rpc.exports = {  
    changemessage: function(message) {  
        var env = ObjC.classes.Environment.getCurrent();  
        var messageSender = env.messageSender();  
        var signalRecipient = ObjC.classes.SignalRecipient.alloc().initWithTextSecureIdentifier_relay_(  
            destNum,null);  
        var contactThread = ObjC.classes.TSContactThread.alloc().initWithContactId_(destNum);  
        var mex = ObjC.classes.TSOutgoingMessage.alloc().initWithTimestamp_inThread_messageBody_(  
            Math.round(+new Date()/1000),null,message);  
        var retVal = messageSender.deviceMessages_forRecipient_inThread_(mex,signalRecipient,contactThread);  
        var retValMessage = retVal.objectAtIndex_(0);  
        return retValMessage.toString();  
    },  
    ...  
}
```

BURPEXTENDER.JAVA

```
1  @Override
2  public void processHttpRequest(int toolFlag, boolean messageIsRequest, IHttpRequestResponse messageInfo) {
3      if(messageIsRequest) {
4          byte[] request = messageInfo.getRequest();
5          IRequestInfo analyzedRequest = helpers.analyzeRequest(request);
6          List<String> headers = analyzedRequest.getHeaders();
7          int bodyOffset = analyzedRequest.getBodyOffset();
8          byte[] body = Arrays.copyOfRange(request, bodyOffset, request.length);
9          String bodyString = new String(body);
10         if(bodyString.contains("destinationRegistrationId")) {
11             JSONObject objRoot = new JSONObject(bodyString);
12             JSONObject objMessage = objRoot.getJSONObject("message");
13             String pyroUrl = "PYRO:BridaServicePyro@localhost:9999";
14             try {
15                 PyroProxy pp = new PyroProxy(new PyroURI(pyroUrl));
16                 String newMessage = (String)pp.call("callexportfunction", "");
17                 pp.close();
18                 Pattern pattern = Pattern.compile(".*content = \"(.*)\"");
19                 Matcher matcher = pattern.matcher(newMessage);
20                 if (matcher.find()) {
21                     String newMessage = matcher.group(1);
22                     objMessage.put("content", newMessage);
23                     String newBodyString = objRoot.toString();
24                     String newBodyString2 = newBodyString.replace("/", "\\");
25                     byte[] newRequest = helpers.buildHttpRequest(headers, newBodyString2.getBytes());
26                     messageInfo.setRequest(newRequest);
27                 }
28             } catch(IOException e) {
29                 stderr.println(e.toString());
30             }
31         }
32     }
33 }
```

All the plugin logic is contained in about 30 lines of code!







BURPSUITE
PROFESSIONAL



BRIDA

FRIDA



LINKS!

- Brida repo: <https://github.com/federicodotta/Brida>
- Brida releases: <https://github.com/federicodotta/Brida/releases>
- Signal example:
<https://github.com/federicodotta/Brida/tree/master/examples>
- Article that describes Brida:
<https://techblog.mediaservice.net/2017/07/brida-advanced-mobile-application-penetration-testing-with-frida/>

GAME OVER!



THANKS!

**ANY
QUESTIONS?**

**FEEL FREE TO CONTACT ME AT
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CONGRATULATIONS MARIO!

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REVIEW

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