#HackInBo

Bologna, Italy

2019

The web is broken

Let's fix it!

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HackInBo Winter 2019 Edition

13ª EDIZIONE

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We work in a focus area of the **Google** security team (ISE) aimed at **improving product security** by targeted proactive projects to **mitigate whole classes of bugs**.

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What is Cross-site scripting (XSS)?

A web vulnerability that enables attackers to **run malicious scripts** in users' browsers in the **context** of the vulnerable origin

- **Server-side**
  - **Reflected XSS**: an attacker can change parts of an HTML page displayed to the user via sources they control, such as request parameters
  - ...
- **Client-side**
  - **DOM-based XSS**: using unsafe DOM methods in JS when handling untrusted data
  - ...

Manual escaping is not a solution

- **Not secure-by-default**

- **Hard** and **error-prone**
  - Different rules for different contexts
    - HTML
    - CSS
    - JS
    - XML-like (SVG, ...)

- **Unsafe DOM APIs** are out there to be (ab)used
  - Not just `innerHTML`!

location.open
HTMLFrameElement.srcdoc
HTMLMediaElement.src
HTMLScriptElement.InnerText
HTMLInputElement.formAction
document.write
location.href
HTMLSourceElement.src
HTMLAreaElement.href
HTMLInputElement.src
Element.innerHTML
HTMLFrameElement.src
HTMLBaseElement.href
HTMLTrackElement.src
HTMLButtonElement.formAction
HTMLScriptElement.textContent
HTMLImageElement.src
HTMLFormElement.action
location.assign
HTMLEmbededElement.src

A better solution: templating systems + safe APIs

- Templating systems with **strict contextual escaping**
    - **Java:** Google Closure Template/Soy
    - **Python:** Google Closure Template/Soy, recent Django (avoid `|safe`)
    - **Golang:** safehtml/template, html/template
    - **Angular** (Angular2+): TypeScript with ahead of time compilation (AoT)
    - **React:** very difficult (but not impossible) to introduce XSS
- Safe-by-default APIs
    - Use wrapping "**safe types**"
        - JS **Trusted Types** coming in Chromium

https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-trusted-types/
https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-trusted-types/wiki/Integrations

The idea behind Trusted Types

Source → ... → Policy → Trusted Type → ... → DOM sink

When Trusted Types are **enforced**:

```
Content-Security-Policy: trusted-types myPolicy
```

DOM sinks **reject strings**:

```
element.innerHTML = location.hash.slice(1); // a string
```

```
Uncaught TypeError: Failed to set the 'innerHTML' property on 'Element': This document requires `TrustedHTML` assignment.    demo2.html:9
    at demo2.html:9
```

DOM sinks **accept only typed objects**:

```
element.innerHTML = aTrustedHTML; // created via a TrustedTypes policy
```

The need for Defense-in-Depth

- **XSS** in its various forms is still a big issue
- The web platform is **not secure-by-default**
- Some XSS (especially DOM-based) are **very hard to prevent**
- **Defense-in-depth** is very important in case primary security mechanisms fail

Mitigation ≠ Mitigation

Reducing the attack surface

vs

- Measurable security improvement
- Disable unsafe APIs
- Remove attack vectors
- Target classes of bugs
- Defense-in-depth (Don't forget to fix bugs!)

Example:

- block eval() or javascript: URI
  ⟶ all XSS vulnerabilities using that sink will stop working
- nonce-based CSP

"raising the bar"

- Increase the "cost" of an attack
- Slow down the attacker

Example:

- whitelist-based CSP
  ⟶ sink isn't closed, attacker needs more time to find a whitelist bypass
  ⟶ often there is no control over content hosted on whitelisted domains (e.g. CDNs)

CSP is also hardening!

- Refactor inline event handlers
- Refactor uses of eval()
- Incentive to use contextual templating system for auto-noncing

Why NOT a whitelist-based CSP?




```
script-src 'self' https://www.google.com;
```

TL;DR Don't use them! They're almost always trivially bypassable.

- >95% of the Web's whitelist-based CSP are bypassable automatically
  - Research Paper: https://ai.google/research/pubs/pub45542
  - Check yourself: http://csp-evaluator.withgoogle.com
  - The remaining 5% might be bypassable after manual review
- Example: JSONP, AngularJS, ... hosted on whitelisted domain (esp. CDNs)
- Whitelists are hard to create and maintain → breakages

More about CSP whitelists:
ACM CCS '16, IEEE SecDev '16, AppSec EU '17, Hack in the Box '18,

Reducing the attack surface with CSP

In-depth talk:

[Content Security Policy - A successful mess between hardening and mitigation]



What is a CSP nonce?

Content-Security-Policy:

```
script-src 'nonce-r4nd0m' 'strict-dynamic';
object-src 'none'; base-uri 'none';
```

Execute only scripts with the correct *nonce* attribute

```
✓ <script nonce="r4nd0m">kittens()</script>
✗ <script nonce="other-value">evil()</script>
```

Trust scripts added by already trusted code

```
✓<script nonce="r4nd0m">
   var s = document.createElement('script')
   s.src = "/path/to/script.js";
✓  document.head.appendChild(s);
 </script>
```

The Easy Way: nonce-based + strict-dynamic

soon

```
script-src 'nonce-r4nd0m' 'strict-dynamic';
object-src 'none'; base-uri 'none';
```

Refactoring steps:

```
<html>
 <a href="javascript:void(0)">a</a>
 <a onclick="alert('clicked')">b</a>
 <script src="stuff.js"/>
 <script>
  var s =
    document.createElement('script');
  s.src = 'dynamicallyLoadedStuff.js';
  document.body.appendChild(s);
  var j = eval('(' + json + ')');
 </script>
</html>
```

```
<html>
 <a href="#">a</a>
 <a id="link">b</a>
 <script nonce="r4nd0m" src="stuff.js"/>
 <script nonce="r4nd0m">
  var s = document.createElement('script');
  s.src = 'dynamicallyLoadedStuff.js'
  document.body.appendChild(s);
  document.getElementById('link')
    .addEventListener('click', alert('clicked'));
 var j = JSON.parse(json);
 </script>
</html>
```

soon

The Easy Way: nonce-based + strict-dynamic

```
script-src 'nonce-r4nd0m' 'strict-dynamic';
object-src 'none'; base-uri 'none';
```

TL;DR Good trade off between refactoring and covered sinks.

PROs:

+ Reflected/stored XSS mitigated
+ Little refactoring required
  - `<script>` tags in initial response must have a valid `nonce` attribute
  - inline event handlers and javascript: URIs must be refactored
+ Works if you don't control all JS
+ Good browser support

CONs:

- DOM XSS partially covered
  - e.g. injection in dynamic script creation possible

The Better Way: nonce-only

soon

```
script-src 'nonce-r4nd0m';
object-src 'none'; base-uri 'none';
```

Refactoring steps:

```html
<html>
 <a href="javascript:void(0)">a</a>
 <a onclick="alert('clicked')">b</a>
 <script src="stuff.js"/>
 <script>
  var s =
    document.createElement('script');
  s.src = 'dynamicallyLoadedStuff.js';
  document.body.appendChild(s);
 </script>
</html>
```

```html
<html>
 <a href="#">a</a>
 <a id="link">b</a>
 <script nonce="r4nd0m" src="stuff.js"/>
 <script nonce="r4nd0m">
  var s = document.createElement('script');
  s.src = 'dynamicallyLoadedStuff.js'
  s.setAttribute('nonce', 'r4nd0m');
  document.body.appendChild(s);
  document.getElementById('link')
    .addEventListener('click', alert('clicked'));
 </script>
</html>
```

soon

The Better Way: nonce-only

```
script-src 'nonce-r4nd0m';
object-src 'none'; base-uri 'none';
```

TL;DR Holy grail! All traditional XSS sinks covered, but sometimes hard to deploy.

PROs:

+ Best coverage of XSS sinks possible in the web platform
+ Supported by all major browsers
+ Every running script was explicitly marked as trusted

CONs:

- Large refactoring required
  - **ALL** `<script>` tags must have a valid `nonce` attribute
  - inline event-handlers and javascript: URIs must be refactored
- You need be in control of all JS
  - all JS libs/widgets must pass nonces to child scripts

Nonce-only is great!

soon

```
script-src 'nonce-r4nd0m';
object-src 'none'; base-uri 'none';
```

XSS Sinks Covered:

javascript: URI	✓
data: URI	✓
(inner)HTML context	✓
inline event handler	✓
eval	✓
script#text	✓ (✘ if untrusted script explicitly marked as trusted)
script#src	✓ (✘ if untrusted URL explicitly marked as trusted)

CSP in brief

Use a **nonce-based CSP with strict-dynamic:**

```
script-src 'nonce-r4nd0m' 'strict-dynamic';
object-src 'none'; base-uri 'none';
```

If possible, upgrade to a **nonce-only CSP**:

```
script-src 'nonce-r4nd0m';
object-src 'none'; base-uri 'none';
```

CSP tools & resources

- How to adopt an effective CSP in your web app: csp.withgoogle.com

- Always double check your CSP with the **CSP Evaluator:** csp-evaluator.withgoogle.com



XSS done, everything else to go...

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Cross site request forgery (CSRF/XSRF)

- Client-side example form:

```
<form enctype="application/x-www-form-urlencoded" method="POST"
        action="https://store.google.com">
  <input type="text" name="action" value="buy_product">
  <input type="text" name="quantity" value="1000">
  <input type="submit" value="https://store.google.com">
</form>
```

- What the server sees when user submits:
  - cookies
  - `action=buy_product`
  - `quantity=1000`
- There is no secure notion of **web origin**

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Cross site request forgery (CSRF/XSRF)

- It's been there since the beginning
- **It's clumsy to address**
- Requires developers to add custom protections **on top of the platform**
- Normally addressed by adding tokens in hidden forms parameters
- It is not clear what to protect, so even using frameworks might lead to issues

Example: GET requests are usually not protected by frameworks but developers might decide to have **state-changing** APIs that use **GET** parameters, or some libraries might automatically parse GET forms and treat them as POST. If this happens **after the CSRF middleware runs** the vulnerability is still there.

Same Site Cookies

- Simple **server-side** CSRF mitigation mechanism

```
Set-Cookie: <name>=<value>; SameSite=(Lax|Strict);
```

- **Lax** allows cross-site navigation (default since Chromium 80)
- **Strict** prevents cookies from being sent in any cross-site action

Cross site leaks (XS-Leaks)

- Extract bits of information via **side channels**
- The attacking page doesn't need to see the cross-origin content, just the **time** it took to load, or the **error** that happened while trying to load
- **Same-origin policy does not protect** against this kind of attacks

For example, **login detection**: loading a frame errors if user is not logged in.

Spectre

- Extract bits of information via hardware issues
- Get around Same-Origin policy because the memory is in the same process, and it can be accessed via **side-channels**
- Requires precise timers, but they can be crafted

Spectre



First execution

Spectre



First execution

Many executions

Spectre

- After many executions the CPU will start **spec**ulating which **branch** should be taken, and will execute it **before the if conditions computed**

- **Some side effects of this can be inspected**



Many executions

Spectre, an example

Run many times with small indexes, then with `controlled_index` > `max_index`

```
if (controlled_index < max_index) {
    secret_value = index_array[controlled_index];
    _ = data_array[secret_value*cache_block_size];
}
```

Measure access time to different blocks of data_array

The one in **`secret_value`** position will be **faster to access**

How do you get stuff in memory?

The legacy of Same Origin Policy

```
<script
   src=https://vulnerable.com/interesting_data>
</script>
```

```
<img
   src=https://vulnerable.com/interesting_data>
</img>
```

COR{B,P}

Cross Origin Read Blocking

On by default, but it is a heuristic

Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy

Enforces CORB and provides more protection

How do you **NOT** get stuff in memory?

Fetch Metadata

- Three `Sec-Fetch-*` **request headers**
  - `-Mode` (cors, navigate, no-cors, same-origin, websocket...)
  - `-Site` (cross-site, same-origin, same-site, none)
  - `-User` (boolean)
- **Servers** can now make **informed decisions** whether to provide the requested resource

Sample HTTP request headers

```
GET /?do=action HTTP/1.1
Sec-Fetch-Mode: no-cors
Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site
```

The code

```
func Allowed(r *http.Request) bool {
    site := r.Header.Get("sec-fetch-site")
    mode := r.Header.Get("sec-fetch-mode")
    if site != "cross-site" {
        return true
    }
    if mode == "navigate" && req.Method == "GET" {
        return true
    }
    return false
}
```

Find a reference module here:
github.com/empijei/go-sec-fetch

Once we block resources...

XS-Leaks: Cross site search (XSSearch)

- A notable example of cross-site leaks
- Extract bits of information from **the time it takes to load search results**
- In 2016 this affected **GMail** and **Bing** to a point where **credit cards could be stolen** in less than 45s and the **full search history** in less than 90s

Cross-site search

- Open a window to `victim.com/?q=search_term`
- Navigate it many times with different search terms and measure timing, or count frames, or read history length...
- Leak data



We could you CSRF tokens but...

Very complicated to add to GETs

Would break some functionalities

Bookmarks would stop working

Lowers caches efficacy

Even if we did...

Tabnabbing

- **Phishing attack** that relies on navigations that the user does not expect
- Example:
    - User clicks on a link on GMail
    - The link opens a new tab
    - The originating page (**gmail.com**) gets redirected to a phishing clone (**gmai1.com**) asking for credentials
    - When the user closes the new tab, they will go back to the previous context and **expect it to still be GMail**
    - User inputs credentials in **gmai1.com**

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How do we fix it?

Cross Origin Opener Policy

- Dictates top-level navigation cross-origin behavior
- Addresses attacks that rely on cross-window actions
- **Severs the connection between windows** during navigation

```
Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: "same-origin"
```



What about the first navigation?

Double-Keyed Caches

Navigations can still leak bits of information, even with

Vary: Sec-Fetch-Site

If a resource is loaded by a page (e.g. profile picture) it is brought in cache, and it is thus measurably faster to load

This could identify Twitter users by using a divide-and-conquer approach (silhouette attack)

Double-Keyed-Caches use the origin that **requested the data** as secondary key.

Recap

```
Content-Security-Policy:
    script-src 'nonce-r4nd0m' 'strict-dynamic'; object-src
'none'; base-uri 'none';

Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: same-origin

Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy: same-origin
```

+

a Fetch Metadata policy

Mahalo! 🤙

Questions?

You can find us at:

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@empijei, @mikispag

Slides:
clap.page.link/fixtheweb